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Rule 41 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Is A
Specifying Dismissal Order Unimpeachable?
Weissinger v. United States'
The fifth sentence of rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides: "Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under
Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, was
called upon to interpret this sentence of rule 41(b) on the defendant's
appeal from a district court judgment which had permitted successful
collateral attack by the plaintiff of a dismissal "with prejudice." The
dismissal had been ordered in a non-jury case after a trial in which
both parties had had a full opportunity to present their claims and
defenses and in which findings of fact and conclusions of law had been
entered. Apparently limiting its holding to a dismissal which comes
after at least some evidence has been received, 2 the Fifth Circuit,
in a novel construction of rule 41(b), held that a dismissal which
"otherwise specifies" means a dismissal order rendered either "with
prejudice" or "without prejudice." On collateral review of a dismissal
rendered "with prejudice" a court is forbidden to look into the record
to determine if the dismissal was actually granted on a ground not
reaching the merits, for example, on the basis of one of the three
exceptions to the "operative effect" of rule 41 (b) - improper venue,
failure to join a party under rule 19, or lack of jurisdiction.
A dismissal "without prejudice" entered after some evidence had
been received would "otherwise specify" and preempt the "operative
effect" of rule 41 (b) ; this much is clear from the wording of the rule.
There is also little doubt that a non-specifying dismissal order under
such circumstances would be final unless an examination of the
entire record showed that the dismissal was based on one of the three
exceptions to the rule's "operative effect." But it is a non-apparent
1. 423 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970).
2. The fifth sentence of rule 41 (b) applies both to a dismissal entered under
that rule and any dismissal not provided for in that rule. Dismissals under rule
41(b) itself may be divided into two types: (1) dismissals under the first sentence
of rule 41 (b) for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with the other rules of
.procedureand (2) dismissals under the second through fifth sentences of rule 41(b),
ie., dismissals which are the rough equivalent of a directed verdict in a jury trial.
Dismissals "not provided for in this rule" would literally include dismissals at the
pleading stage under rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
By distinguishing Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968) (see notes
47-50 infra and accompanying text), the Weissinger court excluded from its holding a dismissal "with prejudice" for failure of the plaintiff to file a security-forcosts bond when that dismissal is granted before any of the substantive aspects of the
case have been heard.
Because of the importance placed by the court on the procedural setting of the
trial in Weissinger at the time the dismissal was entered, the holding in Weissinger
would appear to be inapplicable to dismissals entered under rule 12(b) granted at
the pleading stage before any trial has begun.
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reading which would include a dismissal "with prejudice" as one
which "otherwise specifies" since the rule generally makes dismissal
orders which do not "otherwise specify" adjudications on the merits.
It is the purpose of this note to examine the basis of the decision
that the phrase "otherwise specifies" does embrace a dismissal "with
prejudice" and the possible ramifications of this holding.
In the first trial of this case in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida, the United States sued Mrs.
Weissinger as guarantor for the balance due on two Reconstruction
Finance Corporation loans.' The government alleged that it had made
demand on defendant for payment in accord with the guarantee provisions and that she had failed to pay. The defendant denied that
such a demand had been made. At the close of the government's
evidence in this non-jury proceeding, Mrs. Weissinger filed a motion
to dismiss under rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4
The court denied the motion and requested that the defendant introduce
her evidence. After full trial the court entered lengthy findings of
fact and conclusions of law as required by rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' In these rulings the court denied ten of
Mrs. Weissinger's eleven defenses but on the eleventh defense, lack
of demand for payment, found as a conclusion of law that such a demand
was necessary. The court referred to the demand as "a condition
precedent to payment of any amount due under the agreements." 6
The district court found as a matter of fact that this necessary demand
had not been made by the government and thereupon dismissed the
government's action "with prejudice." The government did not appeal
the decision but later, apparently having made the necessary demand,
brought a second suit upon the same claim in the same court. Mrs.
Weissinger pleaded res judicata. The court held that the first judgment
was not a bar to the second action and granted the government's motion
for summary judgment. Mrs. Weissinger appealed to the United
3. The defendant alleged that the United States was not the proper party plaintiff; but the district court decided for the government on this issue and stated that
the action need not have been brought by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or
its assignee, the Small Business Administration.

4. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) :
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury,

has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving

his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and
render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until
the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against
the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under
Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
5. FED. R. CIrv. P. 52(a) : "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon...
6. 423 F.2d at 785.
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In an en banc review of this decision, the Fifth Circuit overruled
the majority decision of the panel, vacated its affirmance, reversed the
judgment of the district court, and entered judgment for Mrs.
Weissinger.8 Judge Godbold, writing for the en banc majority,
observed that rule 41(b) procedures had been strictly followed in the
first district court trial; the findings of fact and conclusions of law
showed that the district court was entering a dismissal on the merits.
Although the judge thus bolstered his conclusion, he seems really to
have reached it (and to have swayed his colleagues en banc) entirely
upon his interpretation of the provisions of rule 41(b). This interpretation equates the dismissal order's term "with prejudice" to
"otherwise specifies"; thus, the section of rule 41(b) containing the
"operative effect" and its "lack of jurisdiction" exception is never
reached.9 Basically, the court felt that the "scheme" of rule 41 (b) was
7. 423 F.2d 782 (1968). Judge Rives, writing for the maivrity, held that,
although the first action was dismissed "with prejudice" in general terms and such a
dismissal usually acts as res judicata to bar another action on the same claim, the
effect of the dismissal as res judicata should be gathered from the entire record and
not from the dismissal order alone. E.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. ]ioffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943). Upon examination of the record, the majority of the
panel felt that the district court had dismissed the action on grounds which did not
reach the merits. 423 F.2d at 785. Consequently, the majority felt that the dismissal
had "otherwise specified" in terms of rule 41(b) ; the plaintiff was not barred from
a second suit but was only precluded by principles of collateral estoppel from relitigating the necessity of demand. Judge Godbold, dissenting (423 F.2d at 786), argued
that a demand in a case such as the one at bar was not a procedural step in the action
but rather a substantive part of the government's case; therefore, the policy of res
judicata demanded that the plaintiff be barred from a second suit. Judge Godbold
also argued that the majority had violated rule 41 (b) by looking behind the dismissal
to ascertain what had actually been decided and by avoiding the dismissal order's
terms (i.e., "with prejudice") on consideration of the entire record as "otherwise
specifying." But see 423 F.2d at 794; Madden v. Perry, 264 F.2d 169 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959).
8. Issues which are summarily discussed in the en banc majority opinion or
taken as established are the following:
(a) The 1946 amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b), added sentences three
and four to the rule. This amendment in effect adopted the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits' approach of allowing the trial court to "weigh" the evidence. See Ellis V.
Carter, 328 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Penn-Texas Corp. v. Morse, 242 F.2d 243 (7th
Cir. 1957); Bach v. Freidan Calculating Mach. Co., 148 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1945).
The amendment clearly rejected the rule of the Third Circuit that the judge must
only decide if the plaintiff would have had sufficient evidence to take his case to the
jury and view the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff. See Schad v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 136 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1943). For a full discussion of this
area, see 2B W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 919
(1961) ; 5 3. MooE, FEDERAL. P CrccE 41.13 (2d ed. 1969) ; 45 MIcE. L. REv. 788
(1947). For a criticism of the amendment, see Steffen, The Prima Facie Case in
Non-Jury Trials, 27 U. CEL L. Rxv. 94 (1959).

(b) The 1963 amendment of sentence two of rule 41(b) settled much of the
confusion between a dismissal in a non-jury case and a directed verdict in a jury trial.
See O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1961).
(c) If a rule 41(b) dismissal is on the merits, the court is required to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in accord with rule 52(a); and these findings
of fact cannot be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. See Benton v. Blair,
228 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1956); Gary Theatre v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 120 F.2d 891
(7th Cir. 1941).
9. The court stated, "But in trying to determine after the event what a dismissal
order means one never reaches the 'operative effect! rule if the order says on its face
what it means, i.e., 'otherwise specifies.'" 423 F.2d at 799.
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to confer total authority upon dismissals which state clearly and unambiguously that they are with or without prejudice; the court which
collaterally reviews such a dismissal has no power to look behind it.
Conversely, the four judges dissenting from the en banc opinion
stated that the common law did not preclude a court from examining
the record merely because the dismissal was stated to be "with prejudice"; nor was it the "scheme" of rule 41(b) to change the common
law in this respect. Upon such examination of the record the dissent
found (1) that the dismissal was not on the merits and thus it
"otherwise specified" and (2) that, regardless of whether an order is
specifying, the operative effect rule and its exceptions are reached.
On the authority of Costello v. United States,'° .the dismissal would
fall under the "lack of jurisdiction" exception to the "operative effect"
of rule 41(b). The dissent felt, therefore, that the dismissal was not
a bar to a second action after the United States had rectified the defect
of the first trial."
In order to understand this innovative decision, both the majority
and dissenting opinions must be examined against the backdrop of
several distinct, yet overlapping, areas of the law. This note will
discuss (1) the import at common law of a dismissal "with prejudice,"
(2) the necessity for a demand and the common law res judicata
effect of a ruling on necessity - a middle ground for decision, (3) the
"scheme" of rule 41 (b) and its relationship to the common law, and
(4) "conditions precedent" and Costello v. United States."
I.
The prevailing Weissinger interpretation of the "otherwise specifies" language of rule 41 (b) seems to reverse a common law principle
of long standing that a dismissal order rendered "with prejudice"
could, in fact, be reopened on collateral review and be examined to
determine if it was on the merits. In a leading case, Pueblo de Taos
v. Archuleta," an action in ejectment was dismissed "with prejudice
for want of prosecution" and the dismissal was raised as a bar in a new
action on the same claim. The court held that, since the dismissal
was not on the merits, 14 the words "with prejudice" in the dismissal
10. 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
11. Cf. Ripperger v. A.C. Allyn & Co., 37 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 113
F.2d 332 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940). There an action was dismissed
for improper venue and plaintiff did not appeal but brought a second action on the
same claim; the court stated:
While a dismissal of an action on the sole ground that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties is a conclusive determination of the
fact that the court lacks jurisdiction, it is not an adjudication of the merits and
will not bar another action in the proper tribunal for the same cause; nor will
it bar a second suit where the pleader in the prior suit failed to allege some
essential jurisdictional fact which later is supplied in a new pleading.
37 F. Supp. at 374.
12. 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
13. 64 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1933).
14. The court was operating under the assumption that a dismissal for failure
to prosecute was not an adjudication of the controversy which would bar a second
action on the same claim because, at that time, there must have been at least one
decision on the merits in order to bar the second suit. See Haldeman v. United
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order could not lend it any additional weight. The Archuleta court felt
duty-bound to inspect a judgment which was pleaded as a bar and
to inspect the entire record to determine what was actually decided. The
court stated that such an inspection of the record is not a collateral
attack on the judgment because a judgment is not attacked by an
ascertainment of its scope. 15 In another principal case, Goddard v.
Security Title Insurance & Guaranty Co., 1 6 the plaintiff, who was a

depositor of money with the defendant corporation, sued for conversion.
The defendant demurred to the complaint and his demurrer was sustained, the court dismissing the action "with prejudice."' 7 In a subsequent suit on the same cause against the stockholders of defendant's
corporation, the court rejected the defense of res judicata, stating that
the intention of the first court to bar a future action on the same
cause by using the words "with prejudice" was immaterial. If the
intent of the court were the test of the effect of a judgment on a
subsequent action, res judicata would be rendered meaningless as a
legal principle; the bar of a judgment would depend fully on the whim
of the first judge, who would often speak through an order drafted
by counsel.
The language in these cases reflects the common law attitude
toward dismissals with prejudice. 8 In many cases at common law in
which dismissals with prejudice were ordered, the judgment was held
to be a bar -to further actions on the same cause, not because of the
presence of the words "with prejudice," but rather because the judgment was on the merits. 9 While the majority opinion in Weissinger
was that the common law approach was abandoned in the adoption
of rule 41 (b), the dissent perceived no intent to change the common
law. Embracing the traditional rules,2" the dissenters looked behind
the dismissal order to ascertain its scope.
II.
The task of the dissent became one of deciding, on common law
principles, whether a dismissal for failure to make a demand for payStates, 91 U.S. 584 (1875). In this respect the decision is obviously superseded by
rule 41(b), under which a dismissal for failure to prosecute "operates" as a judgment
on the merits. However, the case seems to remain authority concerning the effect of
a dismissal "with prejudice."
15. 64 F.2d at 812.
16. 83 P.2d 24 (Cal. 1938), af'd on rehearing, 14 Cal. 2d 47, 92 P.2d 804 (1939).
17. This dismissal was one at the pleading stage, similar to one under rule
12(b) (6). The Weissinger holding would appear not to apply to make such a dismissal authoritative. See note 2 supra.
18. See also Rivers v. Norfolk, Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 283,
287 (E.D. Va. 1962); Chirelstein v. Chirelstein, 12 N.J. Super. 468, 79 A.2d 884

(1951).

19. See, e.g., Pueblo de Taos v. Archuleta, 64 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Mars
v. McDougal, 40 F.2d 247 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 850 (1930) ; Owen v.
Simons, 134 A.2d 92 (D.C. Mun. App. 1957); Berman v. Thomas, 41 Ariz. 457,
19 P.2d 685 (1933).
20. The dissenters stated, "[T]he addition of the phrase 'with prejudice' cannot
forever preclude the plaintiff from collecting its debt. That is in accord with the
uniform rulings of all previous cases, federal and state, where the phrase 'with preju-

dice' has been added to an order of dismissal which the record showed was made for
a reason which did not touch the merits." 423 F.2d at 803.
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ment is a dismissal on the merits or not. The general standards for
the necessity of a demand were first announced in First National
Bank of Waterloo v. Story ;21 the court stated, "(1 ) When the promise
is to pay one's own debt for a specified amount on demand, no demand
need be alleged or proved. (2) When the promise to pay on demand is
not to pay one's own debt, but is a collateral promise to pay the debt
'2
of another, a demand is necessary, for it is part of the cause of action. 1
In a later case in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Texas Water
Supply Corp. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,28 where the guarantee
agreement was identical to the one in Weissinger,2" the court, in applying the Story standard, stated that "we think that the rule to be applied
should be the same as if the note were the direct and primary obligation
of the guarantors and, hence, that no demand before suit was necessary.
The suit itself was sufficient demand. '25 The district court in the first
Weissinger trial chose not to follow the Texas Water Supply case
and decided that the suit itself was not a sufficient demand. The dissent
objected to this holding but, since the government had not appealed the
decision, it was bound by principles of collateral estoppel from
attacking it. 26
A demand being necessary and not having been made, the en banc
appellate dissent proceeded to determine the effect of a dismissal on
this ground. It concluded that the demand for payment is merely a
precondition to suit and is not an integral part of the merits of the
action. The dismissal was not on the merits, did not bar a second suit,
but merely precluded the government from relitigating issues actually
decided against it.
The en banc majority, despite the fact that the guarantee agreement
provided that the debt was to be deemed equivalent to "the direct and
primary obligation" of the guarantor, 27 might have accepted the
determination of the first trial court that the guarantee was one for the
debt of another and, therefore, that demand was a prerequisite to suit;
it might have read the Story case as making such demand an important
substantive element of plaintiff's case; dismissal for failure to make
demand would thus go to the merits and should bar a second suit. 28

21. 200 N.Y. 346, 93 N.E. 940 (1911).
22. Id. at 943 (emphasis added).
23. 204 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1953).
24. Both guarantee agreements provided in part: "In case the Debtor shall fail
to pay all or any part of the Liabilities when due, whether by acceleration or otherwise, according to the terms of said note, the undersigned, immediately upon the
written demand of Reconstruction Finance Corporation, will pay to Reconstruction
Finance Corporation the amount due and unpaid by the Debtor as aforesaid, in like
manner as if such amount constituted the direct and primary obligation of the undersigned." 423 F.2d at 787 and 802 n.5.
25. 204 F.2d at 194.
26. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDIMENTS § 68 (1942).
27. See note 24 supra.
28. See Haldeman v. United States, 91 U.S. 584 (1875), where the Court stated,
"[T]here must be at least one decision on a right between the parties before there
can be said to be a termination of the controversy, and before a judgment can avail
as a bar to subsequent suit....
There must have been a right adjudicated or released
in the first suit to make it a bar, and this fact must appear affirmatively." 91 U.S.
at 585-86. And in Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232 (1866), the
Court concluded, "If the first suit was dismissed for defect of pleadings or parties,
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In other words, the majority need not have wrestled with the language
of rule 41(b). In relying upon the Story rationale, the majority
could have distinguished the present dismissal from others which at
common law did not act as a bar to a second suit (i.e., because the
substantive merits were not reached). One example is where the cause
of action has not yet accrued. In Waterhouse v. Levine29 the court
held that, where the plaintiff brings suit on a note before ,the debt is
due, he is not precluded from bringing another suit on the same note
after the debt is due. 3 Another example is a dismissal for mere failure
to allege a fact which is necessary to the cause of action." In Clouatre
v. Houston Fire & Casualty Co., 32 it was stated that such a dismissal
does not bar the plaintiff's second suit. In Weissinger the plaintiff
did allege demand; the defendant did join issue; and a full hearing was
held on the matter. The defect was that, in fact, no demand had
been made.
Since the common law could be interpreted either to allow or to
prevent the application of res judicata in the present case, the decision
to apply res judicata might well have hinged on a policy determination.
In this connection, the fact that the plaintiff did not appeal the first
adverse decision plays a considerable role. The cases pertaining to the
importance of appeal are conflicting 3 and depend to a large extent
on whether there was a determination on the merits. In Weissinger
there had been a full trial on all the issues; the defendant had been
required to prepare for the merits of the case. In these particular
circumstances the majority concluded that the government had indeed
had its day in court. Judge Godbold in his three-judge panel dissent
noted that, if res judicata did not apply, the government could sue
again without making a demand and have another judgment entered
against it, sue a third time without demand, and so on ad infinitum.
He felt that this process must have a terminal point and that it should
come after the first judgment. 4 Although the en banc Weissinger
majority used rule 41(b) rather than common law to effect this
result, it is evident that the same res judicata policy was an underlying
basis for its decision. The majority expressed this rationale clearly:
But, in any event, going behind such an order, if ever allowed,
is not authority that a dismissal specified to be with prejudice,
entered after full trial on all issues and with complete findings
or a misconception of the form of proceeding, or the want of jurisdiction, or was
disposed of on any grounds which did not go to the merits of the action, the judgment

rendered will prove no bar to another suit." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 237.
29. 182 Mass. 407, 65 N.E. 822 (1933).
30. See Radick v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 137 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1943).
31. See Fujii v. Dulles, 259 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1958); West v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 121 F.2d 142 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 672 (1941). This kind of
dismissal would now fall under rule 12(b) (6), which dismissal appears not to have
been included within the Weissinger holding. See note 2 supra.
32. 229 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1956).
33. For a decision holding that the plaintiff should not be limited to the remedy
of appeal, see Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 83 P.2d 24 (Cal. 1938),
aff'd on rehearing, 14 Cal. 2d 47, 92 P.2d 804 (1939). Contra, Berman v. Thomas,
41 Ariz. 457, 19 P.2d 685 (1933).
34. 423 F.2d at 790.
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and conclusions, may be treated as a mere warm-up for another
trial if the unsuccessful party decides, without an appeal, that he
would like to go around the track again. We find no case in
which any court has allowed that. 3
III.
Having decided that rule 41 (b) was a more appropriate framework
within which to operate, the en banc majority in Weissinger held that,
on the basis of the language and "scheme" of the rule, a dismissal
"with prejudice" is one which "otherwise specifies" under rule 41(b).
As such, -the dismissal is given unbridled authority; and a reviewing
court need never delve into what has actually been decided. Furthermore, the court held that a dismissal order which "otherwise specifies"
precludes a reviewing court from reaching the "operative effect" rule.
While one intended effect of rule 41(b) may have been to give
more authority to certain non-specifying orders, its expressed intent
was not to render specifying orders untouchable.8" There is some
precedent, however, for the Weissinger conclusion that rule 41(b)
forbids a reviewing court to look behind a dismissal order (whether
"with prejudice" or non-specifying) as was formerly allowed at common
law. In Kern v. Hettinger," where there was a non-specifying order,
the court refused to examine the record saying, "[I]n view of the
unequivocal language of Rule 41(b), and the absence of the words
without prejudice, we must and do decide that the dismissal was on the
merits and it was intended to be on the merits."'8 Further, in
American National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States8 9 the court
refused to examine an affidavit of the trial judge purporting to show
that the case was not decided on the merits since the dismissal order
was not stated to be "without prejudice." The Weissinger court cited
Kern4" and felt that in the case of a dismissal "with prejudice" the
policy of forbidding collateral review is even more compelling.
However, the second conclusion of the Weissinger court, that the
"operative effect" rule of 41(b) is never reached where there is any
specifying dismissal order, even one which specifies the dismissal to be
"with prejudice," appears to have been reached without the benefit
of prior authority. Analysis of relevant cases indicates that none has
gone so far as to provide that a dismissal "with prejudice" preempts
the "operative effect" rule and "lack of jurisdiction" provision of rule
41(b). In other words, none has held a dismissal "with prejudice"
to be a bar where the dismissal was one for lack of jurisdiction,
for improper venue, or for failure to join a party. The reliance upon
35. Id. at 799-800.
36. Professor Moore states that the purpose of the fifth
sentence of rule 41 (b)
is to avoid "any need for speculation as to the intent of the court and the effect of
its dismissal order, where the order fails to indicate whether or not it is with
prejudice." 5 J. MoORE, FERAL PRAcTicE 1 41.14(1), at 1176 (2d ed. 1969).
37. 303 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962).
38. Id. at 340. See Bartsch v. Chamberlin Co., 266 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1959).
39. 142 F.2d 571 (D.C.Cir. 1944).
40. 423 F.2d at 798.
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the "otherwise specifies" phrase of rule 41(b) was apparently a
vehicle to express a broad res judicata policy.
IV.
The en banc dissent reasoned that the "lack of jurisdiction"
exception to rule 41 (b) is explicitly provided for by that rule and the
"otherwise specifies" phrase does not take precedence over it. After
concluding that the first action was dismissed on a procedural nicety,
it decided that the action had indeed been dismissed for "lack of
jurisdiction." The "lack of jurisdiction" exception to rule 41(b) was
defined by the Supreme Court in Costello v. United States. 1 In
Costello the dismissal of a denaturalization proceeding due to the
government's failure to file a required affidavit of good cause with
the court was held to be a dismissal for "lack of jurisdiction" under
rule 41(b). The Supreme Court felt that it was too narrow a reading
of the "lack of jurisdiction" exception to relate the concept of jurisdiction expressed in that rule only to the fundamental jurisdictional
defects which render a judgment subject to collateral attack, such as
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or person. The Court,
in essence, broadened the conventional meaning of lack of jurisdiction to
include dismissals which are founded on the "plaintiff's failure to
comply with a precondition requisite to the court's going forward to
determine the merits of his substantive claim." 42 Since Costello, the
word "jurisdiction" as used in rule 41(b) can no longer be equated
with the word as used in rule 12(b) .3 The Supreme Court made no
attempt to limit its holding to non-specifying dismissal orders (although
the dismissal in the case before it was of the non-specifying variety),
but rather couched its opinion in broad terms, stating, "We do not
discern in rule 41(b) a purpose to change this common-law principle
[no res judicata effect] with respect to dismissals in which the
merits could not be reached for failure of the plaintiff to satisfy
a precondition.""'
The Weissinger en banc dissent, in deciding that a dismissal for

failure to make a necessary demand was dismissal for "lack of jurisdiction," further enlarged that concept. Costello had limited the preconditions to suit, the non-satisfaction of which would make a dismissal
one for "lack of jurisdiction," to those procedural steps required by
the court for going forward with its deliberations; here the precondition
41. 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
42. Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
43. Rule 12(b) reads in part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading . . . shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person,
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure
to join a party under Rule 19.
FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b).
44. 365 U.S. at 286.
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was not such a step, but was one required by the contract relationship
of the parties.
The en banc dissent in Weissinger also extends the holding of
Costello by allowing the "lack of jurisdiction" exception to be applied
in a trial situation where there had been a full hearing of all claims and
the defendant had been required to defend on the merits. Costello
had limited the "lack of jurisdiction" exception in rule 41(b) to those
cases in which the defendant does not incur the inconvenience of
preparing for the merits because there is an initial bar to the court's
reaching them (i.e., a precondition required by the court has not been
met)." The dissent sought to explain this apparent conflict with precedent by arguing that, even though Mrs. Weissinger had met all the
issues on the merits, she could have avoided this inconvenience by
moving for dismissal at the pleading stage"6 and by alleging failure
of demand. If the defendant had done so, the dissent reasoned, the
dismissal granted would have been for "lack of jurisdiction." The
plaintiff should not be denied a non-merits dismissal for "lack of
jurisdiction" merely because the defendant had inconvenienced herself.
Under this expansive view of Costello, it is difficult to ascertain
the extent of the "lack of jurisdiction" exception to rule 41 (b). The
concept of jurisdiction was stretched by Costello itself; the Weissinger
dissenting opinion, which describes a dismissal for failure to meet a
precondition between the parties after a full hearing on all issues as a
dismissal for "lack of jurisdiction," renders the meaning of the word
"jurisdiction" unrecognizable. The Weissinger dissent would threaten
uncertainty in .the application of res judicata principles to any dismissed
action; it sets up no test which could be applied with confidence to
determine whether future dismissals would be for "lack of jurisdiction."
The en banc majority was compelled to distinguish Costello,
which had held that a dismissal under circumstances which were
similar to the ones in Weissinger was for "lack of jurisdiction" and,
therefore, not on the merits. The en banc majority chose to distinguish
the Costello case on two grounds: first, Weissinger is concerned with
a specifying dismissal order, while Costello defined the limits of the
"lack of jurisdiction" exception to rule 41 (b) in the context of a nonspecifying dismissal order; and second, in Weissinger the court made
findings of fact and conclusions of law, while in Costello the court
had not.
The distinguishing of Saylor v. Lindsley 7 was more difficult;
in doing -this the majority severely limits its own holding. In the first
trial of that stockholder's derivative suit, the action was dismissed
"with prejudice" on the defendant's motion for summary judgment for
failure of the plaintiff to comply with an order of the court requiring
the posting of a security-for-costs bond."' In a second suit on the
45. Id.
46. Although Mrs. Weissinger did move to dismiss, her motion presumably ought
to have been under rule 12(b) rather than under rule 41(b).
47. 391 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968).
48. The appeal from this dismissal is reported in Hawkins v. Lindsley, 327 F.2d
356 (2d Cir. 1964).
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same claim, the district court upheld the defendant's plea of res judicata,
holding that Costello was inapplicable. 49 On appeal from that decision,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did examine
the entire record of the first trial and held that, since the dismissal
"with prejudice" was for failure to meet a precondition required by the
court and the defendant had not prepared for the merits, the dismissal
was for "lack of jurisdiction" under the Costello standard. The
Weissinger court stated that Saylor was distinguishable from its holding that a court cannot look behind a dismissal "with prejudice" and
that such a dismissal preEmpts the "operative effect" section of rule
41(b) because in Saylor none of the substantive aspects of the case
were heard, the defendant was not inconvenienced by preparing for his
defense, and the merits had not been reached. It must then be assumed
that the Weissinger holding was meant only to be applied in a limited
procedural setting. 50
V.

CONCLUSION

The principal effect of the W4eissinger decision will be to stop later
collateral attack on a dismissal which has been rendered "with prejudice" under rule 41 (b) after some evidence has been introduced. This
would seem to be a wise manifestation of the rule that a man is
entitled to only one day in court. It might ease, if only slightly, the
overwhelming caseloads of our courts. And although the wisdom of
emphasizing the "otherwise specifies" phrase of rule 41(b) may be
challenged on the basis of prior authority, the result is a clearly defined
standard for application of res judicata principles. When a court specifies that its dismissal is "with prejudice," it is rare that its decision
should be challenged.
49. Saylor v. Lindsley, 274 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
50. See note 1 supra.

